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ABSTRACT 
Loss of offsite power (LOOP) contributes significantly to the estimated core damage 
frequency (CDF) for the majority of nuclear power plants (NPPs). Based on experience from some 
near-miss events around the world and especially in Japan from Fukushima Daiichi accident and 
several other NPPs it was proven the how important power supply is for nuclear safety. Therefore 
comprehensive description of the LOOP initiating event is given in this paper. Specific experience 
of the NPP Krško (NEK) related operation is also presented with comparison to the U.S. NPPs’ 
approaches and experience. Statistical data are given to explain main characteristics (frequency and 
duration) of the LOOP event. Important historical trends are also identified. 
LOOP event frequency is often calculated using generic data because of statistical data base. 
Thereat, many important factors that influence LOOP are neglected, such as the specific power 
network configuration, load profiles, climate conditions, and ageing of the equipment. Several 
different approaches that take these factors into consideration are therefore presented and discussed. 
Familiarity with the actual state of the NPP, power network and weather conditions helps in the 
proper planning process of the test and maintenance (T&M) activities and reducing of the risk. This 
is significant for better online risk estimate. 
Due to the Fukushima accident, it is necessary to review the safety of the NPPs from new 
different angles. This paper also shortly reviews planned modifications in NEK that will increase 
the electric power supply availability (i.e., reduce LOOP event frequency. Other, worldwide 
solutions that can help to avoid or mitigate LOOP effects are briefly presented. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Not very different from the other, nuclear industry strives to minimize the probability of the 
accidents, and to limit the consequences if they happen. In the other words, the goal is to increase 
safety, i.e. to reduce the risk: 
econsequencyprobabilitrisk   (1) 
NPPs are generating electricity most of the time. When not, NPPs need electricity from the 
grid for different reasons, such as operation of various equipment, maintenance work and most 
importantly, to power safety systems. Once the chain reaction in the reactor is stopped, decay heat 
is still generated. Hence, the reactor cooling has to be provided to avoid the meltdown. That cannot 
be achieved without the electricity provided to the reactor cooling system and the heat sink. 





It is important for all NPPs to have permanent and reliable electrical power sources. That 
raises the level of safety in the power plant during different modes of operation. Electrical power 
systems can be either offsite or onsite. Offsite power sources are used if available. If not, onsite 
power sources are used instead. It is necessary to consider the possibility that offsite power sources 
can be lost. That event is well known in literature as the Loss of offsite power. 
LOOP as the initiating event contributes significantly to core damage frequency (CDF). This 
is shown in figure below [1]. 
 
 
Figure 1: The main contributors to CDF 
Hence, it is important to understand the LOOP event, its causes, possible consequences and 
methods to reduce the risk. 
2 NEK ELECTRICAL SYSTEM 
2.1 Design basis 
It is important already in the design phase to choose appropriate location for the NPP. That 
means, among the other things, to consider the electric grid to which the NPP will connect. Some of 
the key parameters are [2]: 
 Off-peak electricity has to be high enough so that NPP can work in the baseload mode. That 
can be assured by locating the NPP near the centers of the electricity demand, 
 reserve generating capacity has to be large enough to ensure grid stability during the planned 
outages, and 
 sudden disconnect of the NPP should not cause the instability of the power network. The 
larger the power network, the more stable it is. The UCTE is an example of such a network. 
Nuclear site which is in the accordance with those three requests reduces the LOOP risk. 
 
2.2 NEK electrical system description 
The main generator is connected to the 400 kV bus via generator load breaker (BBC), two 
main step-up transformers GT1 and GT2 and substation breaker. NEK is connected to the offsite 
power sources via: 
 Double 400 kV transmission line towards Zagreb 
 Single 400 kV transmission line towards Maribor 
 Single 110 kV transmission line towards Brestanica 





During the normal operation, main generator supplies electrical network over main 
transformers GT1 and GT2. It also supplies onsite power supply over unit the transformers T1 and 
T2 to two Class 1E (MD1 and MD2) 6,3 kV busses and two Non 1E (M1 and M2) 6,3 kV busses. 
Class 1E busses are also powered from their respective 3,5 MW diesel generators. The maximum 
operation duration of the DGs is 7 days. 
Alternatively, if that power supply is not available, all four busses that provide onsite power 
supply can be energized from station auxiliary transformer T3, which is connected to the 110 kV 
RTP Krško (underground cable) and directly to combined gas-steam power plant Brestanica. Direct 
connection can be established over the Q92 switch which bypasses the 110 kV switchyard RTP 
Krško. Brestanica is equipped with three gas powered units of 23 MVA (23 MW) capable of the 
blackstart in the event of a breakdown of the 110 kV system and to provide electrical power to NEK 
station auxiliary transformer in 20 minutes. It is an obligation of the system operator to establish 
electrical power to NEK. 
All self-supply safety systems are Class 1E. Safety systems are connected to the one of the 
following voltage levels: 
 6,3 kV AC, busses MD1 and MD2 
 400 V AC distribution system, 4 busses (LD11, LD12, LD21, LD22) and 17 Motor 
Control Centers (MCCD) connected to them 
 125 and 220 V DC distribution systems 
 118 V AC distribution system 
NEK simplified electrical network scheme is shown on the Figure 2. Newly added diesel 
generator DG3 enhances Krško Emergency Power Supply. It can be used as an alternate AC source 
and as the source to MD1 and MD2, i.e. as the replacement for DG1 and DG2. 
 
 
Figure 2 NEK simplified electrical power scheme 
Loss of AC power includes loss of both offsite and onsite AC power. Offsite power can be 
lost because of the failure of either connection to the grid or grid itself [3]. The first possibility 
refers to the switchyard related events, as comprehensively studied in the next chapter. Onsite AC 
power, i.e. DGs can be lost either due to T&M activities or their fail. 
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Figure 3 Simplified fault tree on electric power 
 
3 LOOP ANALYSIS 
LOOP events can be caused by different events. It is easier to understood and analyze it if 
those events are grouped in categories. 
LOOP causes are commonly divided into four categories [4]: 
 Plant centered 
 Switchyard centered 
 Grid related 
 Weather related 
Classification of the LOOP causes is not unique. Depending on the NPP characteristics, 
different classification can be made. 
Before the deeper analysis, it is necessary to describe all four categories [4]. Plant centered 
events are typically caused by human errors, hardware failures, design deficiencies and localized 
weather-induced faults. They occur inside the power plant, up to main and station power 
transformer high voltage terminals (GT1&2 and T3 for NEK). From that point, up to the output bus 
bar in the switchyard is the zone where switchyard centered events occur. The most common causes 
are failures in the equipment, possibly human induced. These two types of LOOP are under the NPP 
personnel control. Grid related LOOP events are those whose initial failure occurs outside the 
power plant, in the transmission power grid. They are mainly the responsibility of the transmission 
grid personnel. Weather related events are caused by severe weather, in which the weather was 
widespread. That condition excludes the lightning strikes from this category. A separate category of 
the extreme weather can be also found in some literature. In this paper both severe and extreme 
weather are merged to one category. 
The latest available study, NUREG/CR-6890 [4], that covers time period 1986 - 2004 and 103 
NPP across the USA has distinguished two characteristic LOOP parameters: 
 LOOP frequency 
 LOOP duration 
The CDF risk is larger for the larger values of the LOOP frequency. Longer LOOP duration 
also increases the CDF risk. In the example of NEK, if one offsite power source is unavailable, it 
has to be restored within 72 hours. Otherwise, power plant has to be taken to Hot stand-by and 
afterwards to Cold shutdown mode. 





The NUREG/CR-6890 study results are presented below. Plant centered causes are analyzed 
together with the switchyard centered. 
 
 
Figure 4: LOOP frequency and duration according to NUREG/CR-6890 [4] 
It can be seen that plant centered causes are the most common, but with the shortest duration. 
Vice versa, weather related causes are the most infrequent, but with the longest duration. Due to 
severe weather, the power network can be seriously damaged, and hence the long time for its 
restoration is needed. This result does not reveal another important difference. Basically, LOOP can 
happen in two different NPP states: 
 LOOP during the operation (reactor is critical) 
 LOOP during the shutdown 
More likely event is LOOP during shutdown, with mean frequency 1,96x10-1, i.e. once per 5 
years, compared to mean frequency during critical operation of 3,59x10-2, i.e. once per 28 years. 
That result is not surprising. During the shutdown, typically outage, numerous maintenance work 
takes place, and not all of the equipment is operable. Below shown results point out that grid related 
LOOP events dominate during the critical operation, and switchyard related events dominate during 
the shutdown. This difference between the critical operation and the shutdown state roughly 
indicates main risks to which attention should be paid.  






Figure 5: LOOP causes according to 
NUREG/CR-6890 during critical operation 
 
Figure 6: LOOP causes according to 
NUREG/CR-6890 during shutdown 
The most common duration of the offsite power sources unavailability, either 110 or 400 kV, 
was less than 1 hour. The complete data is shown on the histogram below. 
 
 
Figure 7: Duration of loss of one offsite power source events histogram for NEK 
3.1 Mathematical background 
In order to calculate the LOOP frequency, it is necessary to know the distribution of the 
events. All four types of LOOP events have Poisson distribution. But, it is not needed to know 
frequency for every of the four types of LOOP events to calculate the overall frequency, because 
the sum of the Poisson independent variables is again a Poisson variable. It is enough to know the 
overall frequency. Proof is given in [5]. Hence, the only needed information is frequency of all 
LOOP events, regardless their type. This simplifies the LOOP frequency analysis. Under stable 
conditions and given a failure rate λ, the number of LOOP incidents during a time period t, denoted 







  (2) 
 
 





Assumption of a Poisson distribution is reasonable. That is confirmed in the NUREG/CR-
6890 for the time period 1997 - 2004 [4]. Also, it predicted one LOOP for NEK in the 30 years with 
the highest probability of 0,328. The only LOOP event in NEK occured in 1986. 
 
 
Figure 8: Probabilities of N LOOP events for NEK 
4 NEK LOOP FREQUENCY CALCULATION 
The last calculation of the LOOP frequency for NEK was made in year 2000, based on plant 
experience up to the end of 1999. The downside of this calculation is that NEK On-Line 
Maintenance (OLM) program was initiated at the end of the 1997. Hence, only a short period of 
time is observed. More accurate results are expected within the new Technical Report. The value of 
LOOP frequency is currently estimated as: 
T
TTTLSPIEV kVkVLSPkV 110110110 )(    (3) 
T total number of plant operating hours 
T110kV total number of operating hours while 110 kV power source is unavailable 
λLSP baseline LOOP frequency, i.e. when it is known that 110 kV power source is not 
unavailable due to OLM. This is the value, which was used as an estimator of “IEV-
LSP” before the NEK OLM was introduced. Here presumed value is 0,05 rcryr-1 [1]. 
λ110kV estimation of conditional LOOP frequency while the 110 kV power source is 
unavailable due to preventive OLM. Presumed value is 0,25 rcryr-1 [1]. 
This equation is a rough approximation. Baseline Loss of offsite frequency λLSP is taken from 
the NUREG-1784 [6]. In that report value of 0,05 LOOPs/rcryr is stated as the value that was valid 
before the deregulation (1985 – 1986). After the deregulation the LOOP frequency is estimated to 
be 0,014, i.e. much smaller. 
One of the fundamental steps in carrying out a probabilistic analysis is choosing the failure 
rates of components. In principle, specific plant data should be used, that is obtained by the 
operating experience of the plant itself [7]. Whenever plant specific data are not available generic 
data from different generic databases are used. 
The 110 kV unavailability represents unavailability of 110 kV power source, or unavailability 
of station auxiliary transformer T3. 
Data about unavailability of the 110 kV power source be found in NEK OLM Risk Evaluation 
Weekly Reports, while OLM activities are performed at NEK on weekly base [8]. 





Table 1 Input data for IEV-LSP calculation 
Year NEK total operating time, h NEK operating time (110 kV source unavailable), h 
1998 7913 70,3 
1999 7479 89,3 
Total 15392 159,6 
 
Taking into the account data from above, NEK LOOP frequency is IEV-LSP=0,052 rcryr-1. 
Comparison with the other known results is given below. If the results are expressed in the 
other way, for NEK it is expected to have one LOOP every 19 years, Surry NPP every 13 years, 
while NUREG results is one LOOP per approximate 28 years. 
 
Figure 9: Comparison of LOOP frequencies 
LOOP frequency calculation can be improved. Instead of using the generic data, it is 
recommended to find power plants with the similar offsite power configuration and to study their 
experience. Furthermore, known data for NEK should be used. Weather data for the Krško area is 
available and extensive. Also, grid reliability evaluations should be performed. 
Some literature as NUMARC 87-00 [9] proposes empirical formulas for calculating LOOP 
frequencies. Mentioned source gives estimated LOOP frequency due to severe weather. The inputs 
for their equation are the annual expectations of snowfall, tornadoes above given severity, storms 
with the wind velocities between 75 and 124 mph, and storms with significant salt spray. 
DGs in NEK are even more reliable than the offsite grid. The probability that one diesel 
generator will fail is 3,3%, and probability for the failure of both is 0,21%, compared to the LOOP 
frequency of 5,21%. 
5 INFLUENCE OF THE POWER NETWORK ON LOOP FREQUENCY 
As already mentioned in the Chapter 5, LOOP events can be plant centered, switchyard 
centered, grid related and weather related. This chapter provides a deeper analysis of the grid and 
weather related LOOP events.  
Electric power grid reliability strongly influences the operation of a NPP, and vice versa. 
Typical grid problems that impact NPP are [10]: 
 load rejection, loss of external load 
 degraded voltage frequency 
 NPP trip causing grid collapse and hence the LOOP to NPP 
 LOOP due to external grid disturbance 
Reliability of the power system includes its redundancy, diversity and lack of the choke 
points. Most of the disturbances are related to the environment, e.g. lightning, wind or birds. Other 
possible causes are the faults of the technical equipment, human errors and other, less important. 
The most common technical faults are related to overhead lines. Significantly less frequently are 





faults of the transformers, breaker and disconnector faults, cable, protection, control equipment 
faults and other [11]. Power system component failures are affected by maintenance practice, 
design useful life and operation environment and conditions. The Croatian power system is already 
aged (220 and 400 kV network are approx. 50 and 35 years old, respectively). It is reasonable to 
assume that aging failures of the components will become a dominant factor of system unreliability 
[12].  
Weather conditions affect both frequency and duration of the faults in the power network. 
Prediction of the duration helps in the planning of the recovery efforts. Paper [13] compares 
statistical methods for modeling power outage durations during hurricanes. It is interesting because 
it ranks influences of the different factors on the power restoration time.  
Generally, in heavily loaded power networks happens more faults and they are less reliable. 
Important information is power flow through the particular power lines. The reinforcement of the 
existing grid would contribute to the decreased LOOP frequency. With a new 400 kV power line 
between Krško and Beričevo LOOP frequency is expected to be reduced for approximately 50%. 
Number of lines (single or double) does not change the result significantly. This transmission line is 
already under construction. It is expected to be finished in the late 2013. 
Proper communication protocols between TSO and NPP operators keep NPP personnel better 
informed about the possible threats. Also, it gives them more time to react. This is especially 
desirable during times of high grid load and stress, which is usually easy to predict [14]. 
Calculation of the LOOP frequency for NEK assuming the different grid layouts is described 
in the paper [15]. 
6 FUKUSHIMA EVENT CONSEQUENCES AND LESSONS 
A short overview of the Fukushima Daiichi event, mostly from the perspective of the Unit 1, 
and with the accent on electrical power supply is given below. 
On March 11, 2011, three out of six units at the Fukushima Daiichi site automatically shut 
down due to the earthquake which caused LOOP. The cause of that LOOP was the damaged 
transformer station about 10 kilometers from the plant. Design basis acceleration in the horizontal 
direction, measured at the Fukushima Daiichi site, was exceeded. The probability for that was in the 
range 10-4 to 10-6 rcryr-1 [16]. The emergency DGs started as expected. Exceptionally, DG in Unit 4 
was out of service due to maintenance.  
The earthquake caused seven tsunamis, which have hit the site more than 24 hours after. 
Flooding of the electrical switchgear and some of the diesel rooms caused the Loss of all AC power 
for units 1 - 5. After that, portable electric generators have been delivered to the site, despite the 
problems with the transportation and installation. The explosion caused by the buildup of hydrogen 
damaged the mobile generator that had been installed to power the standby liquid control pumps. 
All DC power on Units 1 and 2 was lost. Although installed batteries have the capacity to power the 
system for 8 hours, they were flooded, and DC distribution system was damaged. Without the AC 
power and the ultimate heat sink, core cooling was not possible. Offsite power to the Units 1 and 2 
was restored 9 days after the earthquake. 
That scenario could have been avoided with simple measures. Here are mentioned those 
related to the electrical power supply. The first one is sufficiently high location of DG. That is a 
standard in neighboring countries as South Korea. Secondly, portable electric generators were not 
immediately available. Also, secure, and earthquake resistant cable that connects NPP with the 
offsite source would have to mitigate the consequences. That solution is applied on the similar NPP 
in Taiwan. Finally, at Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station, units 1 - 4 are connected by two 
550kV transmission lines and two 66 kV transmission lines; in addition, power can be shared 
among units [17]. 
Due to the Fukushima accident, comprehensive review of the safety in NPPs is requested (so-
called Stress tests). Slovenian Nuclear Safety Administration (SNSA) requested from NEK to 





perform Special Safety Review, which is completely in line with the specifications of European 
Stress Tests. NEK has sent full scope Stress Test Final Report to SNSA in the December 2011 [18]. 
Several natural phenomena can cause LOOP. Earthquakes affect the ceramic insulators in the 
switchyard. Flooding can affect either the switchyard or the wider grid. Strong winds usually cause 
damage to the wider grid. Extremely low temperatures lead to the icing of the cables and thus to the 
grid failure. Some of these phenomena are not applicable to the NEK. Despite that, it is important to 
carry out a high quality and detailed PSA and to study the possible influence. 
The CDF for events initiated by LOOP is reduced by installation of the third emergency DG. 
This modification is finished in 2012 outage. The third emergency DG is located in a separate 
building. It is connected to the separate safety bus (MD3) which can be connected to the one of the 
existing busses, either MD1 or MD2. Both DG and MD3 are seismic qualified. Also it is possible to 
connect smaller, mobile DG to the MD3. The similar safety measure can be found in the other 
countries' Stress test reports also. Besides the new diesel generator, other improvements in NEK are 
also proposed, such as already mentioned power line Krško - Beričevo. 
7 CONCLUSION 
The principle requirement for the NPP operation is ensuring safety. 
It is important to understand the LOOP event, its causes, possible consequences and methods 
to reduce the risk, since it is one of the main contributors to the CDF. LOOP risk can be 
significantly decreased already during the site location selection.  
Proper planning of the DG T&M contributes to the increased safety. Fine weather conditions 
decrease the LOOP frequency. It is desirable to postpone the T&M otherwise. Same as for weather, 
power grid also influences LOOP frequency. TSO's online monitoring and the proper 
communication between NPP and TSO have the potential to reduce the LOOP risk. The latest grid 
state and weather data are prerequisite needed to prevent LOOP events. 
Fukushima event already caused instantaneous improvements in the safety of the NPPs. Stress 
tests identify the possible weak points by observing the plant response in the extreme situations. 
Comprehensive operational experience of the U.S. NPPs and well documented event history 
are applicable to NEK. It is useful to compare NEK to similar U.S. NPPs as the starting point in the 
LOOP analysis. 
Sensitivity studies indicated that emergency diesel reliability strongly reduces Station 
Blackout CDF [4]. The risk for NEK is significantly reduced by the installation of the third DG 
which is installed in the outage '12 and new power line that will connect Krško and Beričevo. 
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